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For 170 years, BHV has been one of Paris’s most durable retail stories, from a trinket shop to a multi‑floored department store that helped shape how Parisians furnished, fixed and lived in their homes. It is a real saga, from the entrepreneurial zeal at the beginning, the rise of consumer society that anchored the store as a home-goods destination, the consolidation under Galeries Lafayette leadership, to the shocks of the last years: a pandemic, a polarising commercial bet with SHEIN, and the subsequent arrival of institutional capital. At stake is more than square metres and sales: the future of a retail anchor whose identity is tightly woven into Parisian everyday life. 

How it all started 

1856: a trinket shop became the “Bazar Napoléon”

Bazar de l’Hôtel de Ville, today known as BHV, was founded in 1856, when François-Xavier Ruel, a hawker selling beanies, opened a modest trinket shop called Ruel Jeune at 54 rue de Rivoli, opposite Paris’ Hôtel de Ville. The store was also called “Bazar Napoléon”, as legend has it that when Empress Eugénie passed by, Ruel saved her by restraining the horses of her carriage that had bolted.

As a thank-you, Eugénie is said to have given him money to expand his business. In 1860, the store was officially named Bazar de l’Hôtel de Ville and was led by his wife, with the goal of being the cheapest store in Paris. Similar to Le Bon Marché's innovative commercial techniques, the store was offering a wide selection of products at fixed prices. Piece by piece, the store expanded to the adjacent buildings. Early on, becoming a hardware store reference in Paris, Ruel also developed other departments, such as women’s and men’s fashion, and even sold a primary form of private-label products. When Ruel died in 1900, BHV had 800 employees.

Building the department store of tomorrow 

His grandson, Henri Viguier, took over, transformed and developed the business. He undertook major works in 1912, building the rotonda and the store’s structure as we still know it today. Viguier is widely regarded as the driving force behind the store's major achievements. After World War II, the store's offerings were redesigned. The basement really became the home improvement and DIY destination it had been for decades. Bazar de l'Hôtel de Ville also accompanied the rise of consumer society and leisure activities by offering fishing, gardening and a sports department in 1937, and selling camping equipment from the 1950s onwards. The department store embraced all the latest retail innovations with the inauguration of an escalator in 1954, the creation of a parking lot with direct access to the store and the introduction of the latest home appliances. From 1975 onwards, Bazar de l'Hôtel de Ville shifted its focus towards home furnishings, reflecting the customers’ growing interest in home decoration, partly due to the baby boom. The store also played a leading role in spreading new consumption practices, including home delivery, home installation, customer service, consumer instalment plans and late-night openings as early as 1963.  

The end of independence 

Following Viguier's death in 1967, the company stayed in the family: Gérard Boulot (1912-2006), Henri Viguier's brother-in-law, took over the management. From 1964 to 2016, BHV opened dozens of stores, owned or franchised in city centres and suburban malls (up to 29 stores in 1989). Then, many stores closed over the years. In 1968, Nouvelles Galeries acquired a significant stake in BHV.1 Two years later, the Galeries Lafayette group acquired Nouvelles Galeries. In 1998, Galeries Lafayette owned two-thirds of BHV. 

The Galeries Lafayette years: missteps and reinvention 

The identity crisis of the 2000s 

In 2005, BHV had 15 stores, generated €527 million in turnover and faced a financial and strategic crisis. Losses in 2004 (€8.3 million) and 2005 (€13 million) had left the group vulnerable. In response, Galeries Lafayette launched a three‑year, €30 million restructuring plan to restore profitability by refocusing the business on home and by transforming a 4,000 sqm nearby warehouse into a men’s fashion store, BHV Homme, across the Rivoli store (opened in 2007 with the ambition to double the category turnover from €15 to 30€ million). Despite the Rivoli store consistently being profitable, the network suffered a sharp sales decline. The overall fall was attributed to several strategic missteps:

• A shift toward low‑margin, low‑value merchandise,
• The abandonment of the lucrative fashion offer,
• A relative retreat from the DIY and home improvement identity, leaving room for competitors in secondary cities, suburbs and even Paris, with a 5,400 sqm Leroy Merlin store opening half a kilometre from the Rivoli store in 2002. At some point, BHV even considered closing the DIY department altogether, but local consumers strongly protested, showing how deeply this legacy component was intertwined with Parisian life. In  2005, the DIY department in the Rivoli store achieved an average turnover of €15,000 per sqm, compared to an average of €2,500 for other DIY retailers.

So, returning to its core strength in home equipment, BHV capitalised on this strength by evolving the concept to organise the product range by room (kitchen, bedroom, bathroom), reinstating fashion assortments, converting a few loss-making outlets into Galeries Lafayette stores, and rolling out pilot transformations at select stores in 2006. That same year, losses narrowed to €4 million, and sales at the Rivoli store increased by 8%. The objective was to regain profitability by 2007. That same year, the Rivoli store accounted for more than two-thirds of BHV's total business and generated 20% of its revenue from its 45,000 DIY and home improvement products. Unfortunately, in 2012, only 4 stores remained (Lyon, Paris, Limonest, and Parly 2). In 2014, seeking a more modern and urban image, the store name changed to BHV Marais, referencing the up-and-coming Paris store neighbourhood.

The Covid years: an ambitious relaunch plan 

Due to the Covid-19, 2020 was the worst year in the history of Parisian department stores. In addition to the unprecedented closures during lockdowns, BHV Marais also faced restrictions on car use on the rue de Rivoli, which has been closed to cars since 2020 and is now accessible only to pedestrians, cyclists and cabs. The lockdowns cost the company 20% of its €330 million in revenue in FY 2020. Visitor numbers decreased by 20% to 25%, and the tourists, who accounted for 15% of the pre-pandemic customer base, also declined.

Despite these setbacks, BHV Marais’ 38,000 sqm relaunched as “Le Beau Bazar” (translating to “The Beautiful Bazar”), positioning the store as both a local everyday resource and an international destination. The basement remained a 4,000 sqm temple of DIY stocking, serving both amateur and professional customers, alongside a comprehensive selection of household goods, furniture, lighting and culinary arts. Complementing the practical offer was a 700 sqm area dedicated to creative hobbies, hands‑on workshops and an “Expert Atelier” for personalised services such as material cutting and custom paint matching to architecture and interior design coaching.

At that time, BHV Marais probably had its most elaborate and ambitious strategy, which seemed able to make the most of the affluent residents and tourists. Food and hospitality were integrated into the retail proposition with 5 restaurants, including rooftop terraces and a chef‑led table. Architecturally and commercially, BHV Marais was also the anchor of a curated urban ecosystem developed by Citynove2 and linking:

• Fashion brand tenants around the department store (BAPE streetwear, Arket, for example), BHV-owned La Niche pet store, and Galeries Lafayette-owned luxury watches specialist Royal Quartz,
• Gastronomy with Eataly Italian supermarket and restaurant, and the innovative Parisian Omnivore District food court in the BHV Homme courtyard,
• Culture with Lafayette Anticipations, Galeries Lafayette’s art foundation,
• All linked by renewed public passages and courtyards designed to create connective urban flows and reinforce the store’s role as a civic as well as a commercial hub.

Omnichannel capability extended the store’s reach via BHV.fr, which listed roughly 90,000 references across a marketplace, click‑and‑collect and express delivery. Finally, sustainability and local engagement were embedded in operations with a 2,000 sqm rooftop farm and beehives to cultivate organic products, extensive repair and upcycling services, and greener last‑mile logistics (GNV trucks, cargo bikes and electric tricycles) to reduce environmental impact.

SGM: new owners, unprecedented problems 

SGM’s entry into BHV’s story 

Galeries Lafayette shifted its strategy to focus resources on its nameplate flagship stores and international expansion. As a result, in February 2023, they entered exclusive negotiations with Société des Grands Magasins (SGM) to sell BHV Marais. The sale to SGM was concluded in November 2023. SGM already had a business relationship, as seven Galeries Lafayette provincial stores had been affiliated3 with SGM since 2021 (Angers, Dijon, Grenoble, Le Mans, Limoges, Orléans and Reims).

The agreement signed by SGM, a family-run retail operator led by Frédéric Merlin, encompassed both the BHV brand and its business operations, as well as the rue de Rivoli building, which was scheduled for acquisition a few months later. The stated ambition at the time was to preserve BHV’s DNA, its focus on home, decoration and accessible-to-premium goods, while reinvigorating the store. SGM also changed the store name and logo from BHV Marais to BHV. They announced plans to invest in merchandising and customer experience.

The SHEIN experiment goes wrong 

Betting on the fact that 40% of the French population had at least made one purchase on one of the ultra-fast fashion platforms, SHEIN and BHV announced a partnership for permanent spaces, first in BHV in Paris, then in the affiliated provincial Galeries Lafayette stores. The news triggered immediate and intense backlash from political figures, retailers and parts of the public in France, raising concerns about fast-fashion practices and an unfair competitive advantage derived from low-value parcel tariff exemptions.

Opening in November 2025, SGM expected the SHEIN partnership would boost store traffic, attract younger shoppers who tend to avoid department stores, generate significant rental and commission revenue and benefit the other store floors. According to BHV, 7,000 visitors came on the first day and 300,000 over the first month, but they did not find the very low prices SHEIN is known for. The average basket was reported at €45 per transaction (well above SHEIN’s online average purchase price of €10), which seems accurate given the price point. Merlin reported to various media 15% to 30% cross-selling rates among SHEIN customers making additional purchases in other store departments. In parallel, he mentioned difficulties: a 10% drop in foot traffic during the fourth week and a conversion rate below expectations. In other words, people came in the beginning, but few have actually bought anything, Merlin acknowledged in mid-January 2026 before the French Senate. The initially planned provincial SHEIN expansions were postponed to unknown dates.

The controversy, along with numerous unpaid invoices, prompted brands to end their relationships with BHV. Around 30 brands and partners cut ties or cancelled collaborations (Disney, for example, for the store's Christmas windows). The store reacted quickly by moving around corners and sections to fill empty brand spaces, but too many spaces remained vacant to maintain a consistent store layout.

Refusing to have its name associated with SHEIN, Galeries Lafayette broke its contract with SGM for seven provincial stores, which were renamed BHV. Since then, Merlin’s questionable reputation has become public information. He is considered a questionable businessman who operates real estate and malls and has numerous unpaid vendor invoices.

At the same time, Banque des Territoires, the state-owned investment arm of Caisse des Dépôts, withdrew its participation after the SHEIN controversy. Reports indicated that SGM was unable to raise the roughly €300 million discussed for the property purchase, and that Galeries Lafayette resumed negotiations with other investors to sell the walls while confirming that SGM would continue to operate the business if an alternative owner was found.

Where does BHV go from here: the Brookfield pivot  

Is hospitality the cure to retail decline? 

By early 2026, Galeries Lafayette announced the finalisation of the sale of the BHV building to an institutional investor, Brookfield Asset Management, a North American company with an extensive global realestate portfolio. Failing to secure the financing necessary to become the sole owner of the walls, Brookfield’s role is that of landlord and capital partner while leaving SGM in place as operator. Also, Brookfield is committed to a comprehensive rehabilitation of the building fabric as part of the longer-term plan.

Brookfield’s takeover of the BHV Paris building could mark a decisive shift in the iconic Parisian department store's future, with plans to reduce retail space by 40% and halve annual rent from € 18 million to € 9 million. The most ambitious element of the new strategy is Brookfield’s plan to invest €150 million in the building’s rehabilitation, including the creation of a five-star hotel on the top floors in partnership with hospitality specialist Experimental Group. This move reflects the current trend in retail, where integrating hospitality and experiential concepts is seen as essential for revitalising legacy assets and attracting new customer segments.

The nearby long‑vacant former C&A store on 126 rue de Rivoli follows the same strategy. It is currently being redeveloped into a high‑profile mixed‑use project led by Redevco. They plan to convert roughly 13,000 sqm across eight storeys into a programme combining retail, restaurants, offices, urban logistics, and a hotel component, aiming to respond to new lifestyle trends while reactivating street life on one of Paris’s main tourist and shopping boulevards. Redevco’s project narrative emphasises socially engaged programming and flexible spaces that can host flagship retail concepts, F&B and services, while improving back‑of‑house logistics to serve both the site and nearby retailers. For BHV, this redevelopment will have consequences: it will change the competitive dynamics on rue de Rivoli, with a diversified tenant mix that may either complement or compete with BHV’s renewed focus on food, services, and everyday needs.

What happens next: the make-or-break moves of 2026 

The near-term picture for BHV is shaped by three strands: SGM’s retail strategy under Merlin, the store’s urgent need to stabilise tenant composition and restore customer confidence, and the new owner’s capital and real estate programme. On the retail side, Merlin proposed concrete repositioning moves in December 2025 to attract local regulars and everyday visitors, unveiling new projects, including a 1.000 sqm food hall for mid-2026, food services, and a French pharmacy, while also preparing a plan to develop BHV’s private label (in place of the Galeries Lafayette brand) and a refresh of the product and concession mix to re-establish reliable revenues.

The next months should also be defined by careful public communications to address the reputational damage caused by the SHEIN episode and to convince both customers and national stakeholders that BHV’s historic character and local value will be preserved. However, SGM will continue to collaborate with SHEIN, with a larger space in the Paris store and adjustments to product assortments to improve conversion rates. Also, SHEIN in Dijon, Reims, Grenoble, Angers, and Limoges are finally set to open on 18 February 2026. The example of Dijon shows concerns for the future months, though. Originally scheduled for 18 November 2025, the SHEIN space has since been filled with winter merchandise and is ready to open, but has been repeatedly postponed. To hide the departure of dozens of brands, the size of the space has been doubled, amid growing discontent and anxiety among employees and the local retail community. Finally, as of February 2026, e-commerce operations are suspended.

BHV’s trajectory underlines a critical lesson: historic retail brands retain considerable civic and cultural significance. Any strategic move that interacts with that civic dimension, whether via tenant selection, brand partnerships or realestate disposal, will be scrutinised by local authorities, customers, partners and media. The Brookfield-SGM plan to pivot the business toward hospitality, food, daily needs and convenience offers a possible route back to stability, more footfall and a pragmatic response to weakened fashion sales. What to watch next is whether SGM can rebuild tenant trust, restore a coherent brand mix, repair reputational damage, and whether Brookfield’s redevelopment preserves the store’s civic function rather than simply monetising a landmark. The viability of the project turns on execution quality and on convincing both staff, partners and customers, but one question remains: after so many relaunch strategy attempts, should BHV be revived? Maybe not all brands are destined to survive beyond 170 years. 

Credits: IADS (Christine Montard)