Articles & Reports
Retailer costs and environmental costs
Retailer costs and environmental costs
An article in The Economist looks at the cost of e-commerce for fast fashion retailers using the example of Inditex. Basically, the store model is described as a “giant bundle of fixed costs” including rent and staff and which turns profitable only when enough merchandise is sold through them. Websites and warehouses cost less to run but because the retailer pays for each delivery, the more is sold, the more the variable costs increase. On paper, the shift online looks appealing, if only because the online channel has significantly lower wages and rent expenses. However, if more customers choose to shop online rather than in store, then the retailer incurs higher variable costs while still having to cover the fixed costs of stores.
Inditex has been reducing store numbers and has set itself a target of raising the share of online sales from 14% in 2019 to 25% by 2022. It has apparently managed to keep operating margins at 17%, while those of, for example, Fast Retailing, parent of Uniqlo the only rival to match Inditex’s sales growth, is a third lower. Considerable investment is being made to allow stores and website to work seamlessly together, in particular with technology such as RFID to locate inventory and fulfil orders either from stores or from a warehouse.
Another troublesome cost of online sales is the high return rate which can be as high as 30%. However, encouraging customers to return orders to stores reduces that cost as well as opening up the possibility of further sales. The item also has a higher chance of being sold again when returned to a store. In the case of Zara, at least, a lower number of stores will mean less visibility for a brand which spends practically nothing on advertising.
For the sustainable shopper, what should be the choice between bricks and clicks? A piece in the Financial Times looks for answers at analysis by fund manager General Investment Management. It makes the point that, as retailers make the last mile delivery more efficient, online will gain the edge. However, this is not guaranteed. Indeed, remembering the economies of scale for stores mentioned above, while store shopping would normally generate higher emissions than online, the emissions per item generated by a larger store shopping trip would fall below those online. Customer transport emissions can vary tremendously according to whether the trip is made by car, on foot or public transport, for example.
Still, online shopping will generally be a greener option than driving to the store for just a couple of items. Somebody who does that three times a week could save about 2kg of carbon a week even by switching to an averagely efficient e-retailer. The article concludes that “bundling orders, minimising returns and avoiding rush shipments would all make a difference. As, of course, would buying less”.
Imagine that, during the recent pandemic, retailers offered customers to shop in store remotely using selling associates, then sent the purchases within the day by personalised delivery (or even organised kerbside pickup by the customer travelling to the store by car), and probably had to deal with a higher return rate than normal for a store sale, then those retailers were accumulating all the most costly options both in terms of their own expenses and in terms of emissions and damage to the environment.
How Inditex is refashioning its business model (The Economist)
Carbon counter delivery van vs shopping trip (Financial Times)
The IADS 100 List : Global perspective on a diverse format
The IADS 100 List : Global perspective on a diverse format
The IADS office is launching an observatory of 100 department store companies around the world for members’ information and to keep track of changes in the format. The companies are not selected by size since the list includes small businesses which may nevertheless be representative of the format in their country. The list is a subjective sample which expresses the diversity of the format, both as it exists today and as it has transformed itself since its beginnings in the 19th Century. The list will be updated and act as a tracker of the format around the world. The very diversity of department stores revealed by the list is an asset when companies share their particular strengths in a group such as the IADS.
The following is a commentary on the list which is a work in progress.
The “creation myth”
Just as cultures through time and around the globe have developed their own creation myths to explain the origins of the world, the planets and stars, and human beings, so too department stores have their own. Some see the origins of the department store in middle eastern markets, others favour 17th century Japanese kimono shops while still others maintain that the expansion of European drapers holds the key to the original idea of the department store. The most widely cited case of the first “modern” department store is probably the Parisian Bon Marché in 1852, described by Emile Zola in his novel Au Bonheur des Dames (1882), held up as a typical department store as well as symbolising the social, economic and technological changes which were both improving society as well as ravaging it (see H. Pasdermadjian, The Department Store, Newman Books, 1954).
Department stores today have become an extraordinarily diverse format. They mostly still adhere to the earliest characteristics which include free entry, fixed price, no bargaining, a certain size (the most common figure quoted is at least 2500 m²), divided into multiple departments selling a wide range of goods. Their original target was the growing middle class emerging with economic development and industrialisation. Over the last one and a half centuries, the format originally based on efficiency has become increasingly complex, making it less efficient and indeed layering on levels of complicatedness (See Yves Morieux, TED Talk). However, arguably, the mixed parenting of so many department stores has given the format extra resilience which, in spite of a decline in market share, has guaranteed its persistence in new and different forms in the retail landscape.
Around the world in 100 stores
At a regional level, the IADS 100 List includes 17 companies from the Americas; 39 from Asia; 34 from Europe; and 10 from the Middle East and Africa, Australia and New Zealand. There are some broad differences in the models operating across continents:
- In Asia, there is a marked preference for the concession model, in which department stores host brands/suppliers. This model is in some cases very close to the shopping mall model. In most Asian markets, the emphasis is on growth.
- In the Americas, and particularly North America, there is a dominance of the wholesale model in which department stores purchase and take responsibility for the merchandise they sell.
- In Europe the model is mixed with some stores favouring the wholesale model, and others operating more closely to the concession model. The emphasis in Europe is on profitability rather than growth.
It should be pointed out that none of these models are totally dominant on any continent. Furthermore, we can observe a series of shifts over time: the Asian companies are searching for competitive advantage in a crowded and competitive market and will be attracted to the exclusivity of own brands or partnerships. At the same time, Americans, while also exploring partnerships for exclusivity, will invite formats into their stores which may increase the proportion of concessions. In the multiple smaller markets of Europe, where the situation is already mixed, concessions are seen as reducing risk, but also as reducing the uniqueness of the offer.
It has often been remarked that department stores do not travel well. Large markets will therefore tend to breed larger companies. It is certainly the case that the US has produced a number of giant department store companies which result from consolidations over a long period of time in a huge market. Macy’s has swallowed and absorbed well over 20 different store companies. However, it has kept Bloomingdale’s as a separate division.
In department store terms, the Asian continent has traditionally been dominated by Japanese companies which have opened (and often closed) in many other countries (where their names sometimes subsist). They have also consolidated, in pairs, in their own market. However, China is a huge market which now has a significant number of players in the format which are growing in large part thanks to the expansion of the Chinese middle class which has historically been the motor of the department store format. It should be noted that Korea is also an important player with one of the largest market shares of total retail by department stores.
In Europe, the average size of department store companies is significantly smaller than on other continents, in part because consolidations have taken place within smaller countries rather than across the continent. There are some large companies such as El Corte Ingles in Spain, the only one left in its market. Germany has lived through consolidations for many years; and the UK’s wide variety of department stores has started shrinking with the recent loss of BHS, Debenhams and many House of Fraser. In the last 30 years, France has gone from over 12 department store companies to just three in 30 years, with a market share estimated at under 1%. The historically small market share of the format in Italy can be explained by a historic dominance of small independent retailers in fashion.
The importance of omnichannel business to the format also varies considerably. It ranges per company from almost nil to around 60% (or more during the Covid pandemic). In general, online business as a proportion of the total retail market is largest in China and the US, in part because of the giant dot.com pure players and marketplaces. It is hardly worth their while for a Chinese department store to attempt to compete with an Alibaba online marketplace, whereas in the US omnichannel has been growing in department stores (and indeed in other formats).
The proportion of global online sales is currently estimated at 18% of global retail sales, forecast to rise to 22% by 2023. Several department stores were above that before covid and we expect a “50% club” to emerge (those department stores registering over 50% of sales from online) already including John Lewis, with Nordstrom and Falabella knocking on the door and others not far behind.
What does diversity look like?
It is clear that even given the lowest size limit mentioned above, there still exists a huge variation in size among department stores. Some of the giants most often mentioned today are the Centum City, Busan, store of Shinsegae (293 000 m²), the SKP stores such as the Beijing one at some 200 000 m², or even Macy’s in Herald square New York, claiming to weigh in at 200 000 m² GLA. It is clear that operating such a business requires different skills from those needed to run one of the smaller stores (under 5000 m²) of the important Swiss chain Manor. An appropriate management structure including regional directors overseeing several smaller stores, or floor directors responsible for one or more floors of a large structure, is often created. The size of overall companies may also vary considerably in our list (see Liberty of London compared to Falabella of Chile, for example).
The composition of the department store portfolio of a company may consist at one extreme of a number of stores which are fairly well balanced in terms of size and revenue (such as the late Debenhams in the UK which could properly be described as a chain), or of a large flagship with a “long tail” of smaller stores capitalising on the flagship brand (which was the case of Galeries Lafayette before it put a number of its smaller stores out to franchise). Clearly an unbalanced portfolio of stores can make the retail operation extremely complex in terms of assortments, contracts with suppliers etc.
Some of the complications of running a multiple department store business may come from a history of consolidation. Frasers group in the UK, for example, over time acquired and, in some cases, consolidated over 20 different names. In each case this means merging company cultures internally, and communicating brand meaning to customers (there were street demonstrations in Chicago when Macy’s changed the name of Marshall Fields to its own in 2006). Macy’s, the world’s largest department store company in terms of revenue, probably has managed also the greatest number of takeovers of rival department store names. In Japan, several pairs of department stores have joined forces over the last decades such as Hanshin and Hankyu, Isetan and Mitsukoshi, or Daimaru and Matsuzakaya. However, it is sometimes complicated to understand exactly what that means in operational terms.
Indeed, in some places, one department store company has risen to the top and exercises a quasi-monopoly in the department store market after acquisition of its rivals. This is the case, for example, of El Corte Ingles in Spain which acquired its only rival Galerias Preciados in 1996. However, all countries are not characterised by one dominant department store company and a litter of smaller niche companies. Countries where department stores hold the largest market share in terms of the share of total retail trade, are often characterised by several strongly competing companies. This is the case in South Korea, for example, with companies Lotte, Shinsegae, Hyundai and Galleria accounting for perhaps over 5% market share. The same situation obtains in Chile with Falabella, Paris and Ripley waging war in an unforgivingly competitive retail market.
The degree of rivalry also depends on the market positioning of the department store companies. Some have chosen to remain or shift towards the luxury end of the market such as Breuninger in Germany, or Bon Marché, part of the LVMH group. Just as society is supposed to be polarising along income and wealth lines with significant shifts in Gini coefficients, so retail and department stores are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain profitability catering to a shrinking middle-class market. The degree of dependence on the tourist trade will also impact some but not other companies. Large flagships in world capitals will be operating a different business from those stores serving a more local clientele.
The situation can vary in markets where the format is older compared to markets where department stores are relatively recent creations. In the former, the emphasis will be more on precision retailing and maintaining profitability, whilst in newer department store markets, the emphasis will be on development and growth (as it was indeed when the format was created in Europe or the US). Thus, SM in the Philippines has, until Covid slowed us all down, seen a remarkable organic growth rate in terms of numbers of stores and centres around the islands of the country. Similarly, with Hong Kong and plans at Sogo of the Lifestyle Group, although recent political events have complicated matters. The outstanding example, in this regard at the moment is, of course, China where SKP is planning to open giant stores across the country in the next two or three years. In Thailand, The Mall Group is continuing its considerable investment programme, while Central Retail Group has been acquiring famous department stores in Europe such as Rinascente in Italy, KaDeWe in Germany, Illum in Denmark, and most recently Globus in Switzerland.
The perspective on development, investment and growth will depend to a significant extent on whether a department store company is privately held or public. Privately owned companies are expected to adopt a more long-term perspective than public companies. However, while this may be true to a large extent for family-owned companies, it is certainly not the case for equity investors who may take a company private after a takeover. The case of the Canadian company Hudson’s Bay which took over Lord & Taylor and Saks Fifth Avenue under US investor Richard Baker is an example of the latter case, Lord & Taylor having been sold and closed down.
This huge diversity within the same format translates into a considerable stock of collective experience to be shared in an organisation such as the IADS: the early development of e-commerce or marketplaces; concession management; private label development; fulfilment options; the adoption and integration of various softwares and technologies; organisation structures and HR management; supply chain strategies; marketing innovations and visual merchandising standards; store design… These are but some examples which may be expressed quite differently (or indeed at different moments in time) across the range of department stores, but which are nevertheless applied within a common format. The learnings are potentially huge.
Die another day
Just as we started with the department store creation myth, we need to end with an “apocalypse myth”. The end of department stores has been forecast for a long time. Every time a new retail format emerges, it is said to be another nail in the coffin of department stores. Thus hypermarkets, big box discounters, fast fashion chains, and, of course, online retailers have all been named at different times as factors hastening the doomsday of department stores. The most recent predictions have been related to death by covid, which is supposed to have accelerated an already active process of decline (see NYTimes piece).
The IADS believes to the contrary that those department stores which have survived, and in some cases thrived, will find the resilience to develop and be born again, perhaps with a modified business model. Visions of apocalypse are usually a reflection of our fears at any given moment. Those fears are real but can be harnessed and put to work to create a new version of the format using its diversity as a strength.
The IADS 100 List is intended to chart aspects of the format as it copes with the latest challenge (and perhaps future ones).
Note: How to read (and how not to read) the IADS 100 list
Is department store data available and comparable? While department store diversity can be a strength when shared, it also makes comparisons difficult. It is clear, for example, that data concerning revenue, profits, selling space etc. will often not be available from privately held companies. If the IADS obtains such data privately and confidentially, we will not publish it.
Standards between companies and between countries will vary sometimes quite considerably, because of history, accepted practices or indeed accounting standards and legislation. For example, in some companies, reported revenue will cover only sales of goods owned by the store and not the sales made through concessions operating within the store and paying a commission. This is the case for example with Harrods of London which officially reported a latest-year revenue of £607 m but unofficially a “gross merchandise revenue” (goods sold through the store) of £ 1 041 m. Some companies in Asia generate revenue mainly from concessions.
Profitability is also reported differently (when it is reported at all): it may be operating profit, EBIT, EBITDA, or net (attributable) profit. These are sometimes defined differently from one company to another. They can also give very different pictures of a company. For example, although some companies have been clearly still operationally profitable even during covid, they may still suffer an overall loss. The main interest of the IADS will be to evaluate operating profitability. We will however report overall department store, company or group profits where available.
The IADS also focuses on department store operations, sometimes the only activity of a group, but in other cases only a small part of a group’s operations. Ideally, we would be able to report a group’s results as well as those of the department store division within it. This is not always possible, however. In some cases, the differences are minimal while in others they can be considerable. The Hanwha Group of Korea is a large business conglomerate covering aerospace, chemicals, energy, finance, construction, as well as leisure and lifestyle under which can be found hotels, resorts and the Galleria department stores, representing around 1% of total group business. Similarly, the Sogo Seibu stores of the Seven & I group of Japan represent under 8% of total activity.
International companies are also sometimes structured by country in which the results of department stores are not distinguished from those of other formats in that country such as supermarkets or DIY. This also can pose a problem for the extraction of the pure department store activity.
Finally, many, but not all, of the companies listed have some e-commerce activity. That activity may be local or international (such as Breuninger in Switzerland or Bijenkorf in France). It may sometimes but not always be listed separately from the brick & mortar store activity. Probably the most notable in this respect is John Lewis of the UK for which online represents over half of total activity.
The “elephant in the room” is, of course, the past year of covid lockdowns. Some of the figures include that period, others include some of that period and yet others only cover the period preceding covid. This naturally makes any comparison of the effects of covid impossible. With time, as the list evolves, this problem will disappear. However, it should be noted that financial years can be very different across companies, even within the same country.
The latest figures from Statista show the impact of covid on retail sales in different categories online. While supermarkets and sports equipment have clearly benefited from lockdowns, tourism, travel, fashion, and accessories (important to department stores) have suffered. Overall, retail sales are expected to be down 5.7% in 2020. So the figure is likely to be considerably higher for department stores.
Credits: IADS (Dr Christopher Knee)
ASIA: Sample of 39 companies covering 12 countries. Total sales € 88 bn
EUROPE: Sample of 34 companies covering 18 countries. Total sales € 55.1 bn
AMERICAS: Sample of 17 companies covering 12 countries. Total sales € 66.9 bn
MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, OCEANIA: 10 companies covering 6 countries. Total sales: € 7.6 bn
All you need to know about Buy Now Pay Later
All you need to know about Buy Now Pay Later
Buy Now Pay Later (BNPL) financing solution is not new, and retailers already know for years such interest-free instalment plans. While basically being a loan, it is nowadays marketed as a convenient payment option and has steadily and quietly developed over the 2010’s. Covid-19 only accelerated its growth as both retailers and consumers found great interest in such a payment method.
According to Affirm fintech, BNPL is expected to triple over the next two years. Stating BNPL is rapidly growing is an understatement. According to
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published in July 2020, the global market was valued at USD 7 320 million in 2019 and should reach USD 33 638 million by 2027. North America is currently the biggest market by volume and revenue and Asia Pacific is expected to be the fastest growing region in the future.
That said, what does BNPL have to offer? Should retailers bet on it and why? Should customers trust such a payment method? Is it a sustainable model or will it change in the future?
BNPL and retailers: a match made in heaven?
First, let’s see how it works from a financial point of view. Like most payment solutions, BNPL firms are paying full purchase amounts upfront while charging fees to retailers: they are usually coming as a flat fee along with a commission, both taken on each transaction. Depending on the countries and whether it’s Afterpay, Klarna or Affirm (some of the largest BNPL companies), fintechs charge retailers a flat fee of USD 0.3 to 1 (for processing the payment) and a commission of 3% to 6% depending on the purchase amount. These rates are higher than debit card (accounting for 0.5 to 1% per sale) or credit card ones representing up to 2% per transaction.
Retailers’ margins have been dramatically challenged over the past years. Discount periods and rates have only been rising, sometimes representing up to 10 months a year, especially in fashion, a crucial part of the business for most department stores, and for BNPL users. Acceleration in e-commerce has also been affecting margins with supply chain investments and customers’ expectations for free and fast deliveries. In this environment, BNPL solutions are efficient but they surely represent additional costs for retailers. Last, it’s worth knowing that, as Klarna states on its website, BNPL technology allows customers to set price alerts on saved items for them to “never pay full price again”. Not really a message merchants want to hear…
On the bright side now, numbers claimed by BNPL companies are like winning the lottery as the benefits in volume and recurring spending seem to be worth the high fees. Retailers, by offering a BNPL option, are creating a relationship with consumers that are keen to purchase. According to BNPL companies, shopping carts increase up to 30%, abandonment at checkout decreases up to 25%, repeat customers increase up to 20%, and return rate reduces. Affirm, Afterpay, and Klarna see average basket value rise 85%, 30%, and 45% respectively.
The magic in BNPL solutions also stands in their younger customer base. Afterpay claims that 73% of their shoppers are Millennials and Gen Z consumers. And merchants say that 30% or more of Afterpay customers are new to their brand. Macy’s (partnering with Klarna), said that 40% of shoppers using BNPL are new shoppers and 45% are under 40 years old. Only 25% of Macy’s existing customers are under 40.
Considering the challenges retailers are currently facing, proposing a BNPL payment option is worth it: sales volume will increase, customer base will grow and merchants might start long-term relationships with younger consumers they would not have been able to reach otherwise. Retailers will also benefit from additional and unprecedented visibility thanks to BNPL apps, designed to display brands and products in a seductive way. These new shopping apps are a complementary channel for retailers, and an important one as they are targeting younger generations.
Many younger customers are considering themselves as being part of a community. This is why word of mouth explains a fair part of the BNPL success, recommendations from friends or influencers working their magic. In 2020 in the U.S.,
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shows 27% of BNPL users heard about it on social media and 18% through friends and family. In this environment, BNPL is appealing to younger generations facing difficulties in accessing credit cards or simply considering them old-school or untrustworthy.
Furthermore, BNPL is about data. Becoming shopping destinations, BNPL apps are connecting customers to merchants thanks to an algorithm personalising brands, products and deals for each user. Needless to say, fintechs are gathering a huge number of information on shoppers while remaining very silent about the ownership of such data. Because of that, it’s hard to believe that ownership would go to retailers. So the question is key when entering a deal with a fintech. But retailers might learn a lot about their new customers anyhow, as they are collecting all information about the purchase itself.
IADS members have already embarked on BNPL business. Interestingly, The SM Store in Philippines has developed a partnership with 13 banks, not with a BNPL fintech. Started in January 2021, the department store offers to pay any item in 3, 6 or 12 interest-free instalments, depending on the purchase amount. Though they are not called BNPL, IADS members are offering -and have been offering for a while- instalment plans through their credit cards.
Pay later, but pay up
Whether it’s through Netflix or Amazon Prime, we are all living a part of our lives through subscriptions. Watching a movie at home has become a seamless experience as well as its payment thanks to monthly instalments. As a result, consumers are more and more used to frictionless and contactless payments solutions and Covid-19 has accelerated this trend.
When it comes to customers, BNPL promise is double. First, convenience. As applying for a classic instalment through a retailer’s credit card requires much information and sometimes frictions and delay, the BNPL registration process is supposed to be seamless and fast. The approval, relying on the shopper’s debit card, is occurring in real time and not affecting applicant’s credit score (assuming they pay on time).
The payment part is easy: shoppers just have to confirm instalment terms (number of payments, amount of each one) and total cost of the purchase. Payments due in three or four instalments are interest-free, while the interest rate goes from 15% to 24% for payments from five to six instalments or more. If BNPL option is not offered by the retailer, fintechs can instantly create a virtual one-time card number to be added to Apple or Google wallets.
Convenience is also a factor in budget management. A Cornerstone survey shows that most BNPL millennial customers in the U.S. don’t really need to postpone payments as they earn more than USD 75 000 a year and hold credit cards, but rather prefer paying in instalments to help their budgeting.
Second part of the promise: providing essential financial service. Given the current economic environment, it’s true that flexible financial options have proved necessary to some people. To appeal to them, Affirm motto is reassuring: “Pay at your own pace. When you buy with Affirm, you always know exactly what you’ll owe and when you’ll be done paying. There are no hidden fees—not even late fees.” BNPL solutions usually cover payments from USD 50 to USD 17 500 so they are now also used to pay for small daily expenses, bills, or even tuition fees.
Trouble in paradise?
One of the main interests for merchants using BNPL solutions is to access to younger customers and engage in long-term relationship with them. But it might come at a risk. A BNPL study conducted by The Ascent shows that only about 1 in 5 of consumers who use BNPL apps actually understand how they work. To some immature customers, an item will seem more affordable than it is if its payment is split in multiple months. If they end up paying important additional fees, who will the shopper blame, the BNPL company or the retailer? One can guess that the retailer will be seen as guilty, putting the customer relationship at risk for the future.
Whether it’s splurging or just paying for commodities, these payment options are often stretching consumer financial capacities beyond their real means, leading some of them to fall into debt. And this is currently the major factor limiting an even bigger increase of BNPL, as complaints regarding the late fees are increasing. For instance, Afterpay charges USD 10 for each missed payment and USD 7 if the instalment remains unpaid after a week. Users missing all the instalments are charged a late fee of USD 68. Considering most of the payments made using BNPL are under USD 500, these fees are relatively high.
According to a survey conducted in the U.S. in November 2020 by Credit Karma, nearly 40% of consumers who used BNPL missed more than one payment. Nevertheless, Klarna, which has partnerships with over 250 000 retailers, said credit losses have fallen across all major markets. Afterpay, also said that late fees from consumers accounted for less than 9% of company’s income in the 2020 last quarter.
What’s next for BNPL?
While BNPL business surged with the pandemic, and given the nature of its customer base, the question of responsible lending policies arose in some countries. In the U.K. for instance, where the BNPL market represents USD 3.7 billion, consumer groups asked for regulation. As a result, the U.K. Treasury announced BNPL companies will have to conduct affordability checks before lending to customers.
More responsibility could come through certification. Sezzle, a BNPL company has recently been “B Corp” certified. This certification concerns for-profit companies that are taking into account the community they are engaging with. In the case of Sezzle, “B Corp” certification has acknowledged a commitment to financial education and a support to young adults in their purchase needs.
But still, is BNPL a sustainable business model? Fintechs could be considered as an additional middle-person between consumers and retailers, a position usually only occupied by banks. This is where an interesting battle might happen. As a direct competition to banks, Affirm launched a debit card, showing BNPL companies are willing to gain on the banking industry. On the other hand,
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knowing they are ideally positioned to enter the market. They are able to tailor BNPL solutions through their own debit or credit cards, additionally taking advantage of all the data they own as well as their capacities in terms of security. In that case, banks could eventually eat BNPL firms alive.
***
What about retailers? Even though BNPL might only be a fleeting trend led by younger generations, offering a BNPL payment option to customers is as profitable as it is necessary to gain additional shoppers and new sources of revenue. At least for the time being, even if BNPL solutions are a competition to retailers’ credit cards.
For tomorrow, the goal could be to transform these shoppers into store-branded card holders by evolving the credit card solutions to include BNPL options. The example of Macy’s is really of some interest. Besides offering Klarna’s BNPL options to customers, the department store has invested in the fintech, showing a first step and possible path to fully include BNPL in its offer.
Credits: IADS (Christine Montard)
What should we do with our stores? Close some and change others
What should we do with our stores? Close some and change others
Many department store companies today are struggling with their physical store legacy. Stores may be too big, too many or unsuitable. Some big decisions are currently being considered in the light of the acceleration of trends provided by covid, the apparent disaffection of customers with stores and the declining profitability of the existing department store model. Some companies are closing stores, some are upgrading them, and others are considering different business models.
Stores vs online, and brand value
Figures from before the covid pandemic estimated the global share of online retail to be 18% in 2021. This is now probably a serious underestimate.
